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he financial system, acting as intermediary between savers and borrowers, investors and 
entrepreneurs, sellers and consumers, plays a pivotal role in the functioning of the EU 
economy. The development of financial markets and institutions can therefore be a 
significant factor in inclusive and sustainable economic growth. However, this not only requires 
a partial shift in policies, but also in the way these rules are determined to take into 
consideration the increasing complexity and ever more rapid changes in financial sectors and 
society.  
In general, policies to develop the EU financial system further should focus more on access and 
efficiency than on deepening (increasing its size). According to the latest research, increasing 
the size of developed financial systems adds little to economic growth, but can make the system 
more fragile as was demonstrated by the 2007-09 global 
financial and 2010-12 Eurozone economic crises. 
Looking at the size of the financial systems in the EU, the 
member states in the west and north have significantly 
larger financial systems than those in the east and some 
in the south. The latter would therefore be better served 
by a deepening of their financial system than the former, which are better served by measures 
focusing on efficiency and access. Ongoing digital transformation and climate change actions 
might work as a catalyst in this respect, while Brexit constitutes a serious obstacle to financial 
development. 
In the aftermath of the financial and economic crises, many measures were introduced to make 
the EU financial system safer and more resilient. During the Juncker Commission the focus on 
the one hand was on completing these measures such as the Banking Union, and on the other 
to contribute to economic growth and job creation for instance by the launch of the Capital 
Markets Union (CMU). In this way, the finance agenda contributed to three out of the ten 
priorities of the Juncker Commission: a new boost for jobs, growth and investment (Priority 1); 
a deeper and fairer internal market with a strengthened industrial base (Priority 4); and a 
deeper and fairer economic and monetary union (Priority 5).  
Figure 1. Size of the financial sector as share of GDP (end-2017) 
 
Note: No comparable information on debt securities issued was available for Romania.  
Source: AMECO (2018), BIS (2018), ECB (2018) and ECMI Statistical Package (2018). 
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The following sections will discuss both the main initiatives that the European Commission has 
taken in the area of finance during the Juncker Commission as well as recommendations for 
the new Commission. 
Completing the Banking Union 
The Banking Union was initiated in 2012 in response to the economic crisis in order to break 
the sovereign bank nexus. During the financial and economic crises governments and central 
banks injected roughly €2,500 billion into Eurozone banks to avoid destabilisation of the 
financial system (De Groen, 2018). Part of the funds were to cover the losses on government 
exposures. In turn, the funds required for the banking system in Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Spain 
and Portugal, and their economic and fiscal situation, pushed Eurozone countries to lend 
almost €300 billion to these countries. 
The Banking Union is supposed to avoid Eurozone banks requiring government funds. To 
achieve this, the supervision and resolution of systemically important banks has been moved 
to the Eurozone level – with the ECB responsible for supervision and the SRB for resolution of 
these banks. The Commission intends to complete this with a deposit insurance. In recent 
years; the Commission has come up with several proposals to establish a Eurozone Deposit 
Insurance Scheme (EDIS), but despite efforts to reduce the risks in the banking sector, there 
seems insufficient political support from member states for the proposed forms of EDIS. The 
potential mutualisation of losses appears to be the main reason why member states oppose 
EDIS. Given the importance for the functioning of the Eurozone financial crisis management 
framework, alternatives such as a re-insurance scheme should be considered going forward 
(Gros, 2015). 
In addition, bank failures since the establishment of the resolution mechanism and several 
analytical reports have exposed some shortcomings of the resolution mechanism. In particular, 
the resolution mechanism was circumvented several times. Instead of the resolution 
mechanism, precautionary recapitalisation and insolvency regimes were used, which allowed 
national governments to inject funds in failing banks (De Groen, 2017). Moreover, although 
discussions in the Council have made progress, there is still no final agreement on a backstop 
for the resolution fund or on liquidity for resolution, which limits the Single Resolution Board’s 
capacity for orderly resolving banks. 
Finally, a completed Banking Union should indeed avoid governments being required to bail-
out their banks. However, the reverse relation – governments causing losses for banks – has 
not been addressed effectively. The exemption from the large exposure requirement for banks 
holding government bonds and zero risk weight for government bonds should be reconsidered 
to reduce the home bias in bond holdings as well as the potential destabilisation of banks due 
to failing governments (De Groen, 2015). 
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Creating a true Capital Markets Union 
The development of deep and liquid capital markets should provide SMEs in particular and 
other businesses an alternative to the currently dominant bank financing as well as facilitate 
private risk-sharing (Valiante, 2016). The need for the development of EU capital markets 
increased during the Juncker Commission with the announcement of the UK’s departure, as it 
currently hosts the largest EU capital market. The UK has a particularly important role in the 
derivatives market, which led the Commission to launch a proposal covering derivatives 
clearing in third countries. 
In total the CMU action plan included 13 legislative proposals, excluding the three legislative 
proposals related to sustainable finance. Although all the proposals initially foreseen have been 
published by the Commission, only the three proposals related to venture capital, securitisation 
and the prospectus directive were adopted by November 2018. On most of the other proposals 
covering new products and services (pensions, covered bonds and collective investment funds), 
prudential rules (investment firms, SME accessing growth markets and taxation) as well as 
market supervision and resolution (central counterparties), the Parliament and Council reached 
an agreement just before the end of the legislature. Proposals 
on crowdfunding, preventive restructuring, cross-border 
claims, second chance measures, European supervisory 
authorities are as of March 2019 still being discussed by the 
Parliament and Council. 
Overall, CMU did not have a meaningful impact on the growth 
of market financing in Europe. Bank financing remains by far the preferred source of external 
finance, even at a higher cost. More needs be done to tackle the bias towards debt financing, 
in regulation, perceptions, tax systems and the policy debate. Debt financing is not suited to 
start-ups and high-growth companies – only equity financing can provide what is needed. The 
European capital markets programme should therefore be fundamentally revised after an 
extensive assessment of the options. 
Promoting sustainable finance 
Europe aims to be at the forefront of international efforts to deliver on the UN 2030 Agenda 
and Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Climate Agreement. In the context of the 
CMU, the Commission has committed to unlocking the full potential of public and private 
investment to support the transition towards a low-carbon, circular and resource-efficient 
economy. The three packages launched so far include: i) a taxonomy for environmental 
sustainability of investment instruments; ii) rules on disclosure of sustainability risks; and, iii) 
minimum standards for low-carbon benchmarks.  
But more will need to be done to mainstream sustainable investments. It is often argued that 
current market prices do not accurately reflect environmental and social externalities because 
of the failure to put in place adequate market mechanisms, regulations, taxation or other 
policies. The integration of Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) factors would improve 
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the inclusion of these externalities. For this, a workable, flexible and dynamic taxonomy should 
be developed for integration in investment and advisory processes.  
The use of financial legislation to provide incentives or disincentives for investments deemed 
sustainable or not should be exercised with caution. For example, lowering the risk weights for 
the calibration of bank capital requirements or the capital charges for insurance companies’ 
solvency position based on a newly developed EU taxonomy on sustainable activities must have 
a sound prudential basis. This is essential in order to avoid misallocation of resources. 
Large companies tend to report more comprehensive ESG metrics and therefore dominate the 
portfolio of sustainable investment portfolios. However, when it comes to access to sustainable 
assets/products, a priority should be to ensure that other important economic actors such as 
SMEs and innovative, growth companies are also well represented in the portfolios. Moreover, 
the investment products should be available to both high net worth individuals, institutional 
investors and retail investors (Amariei, 2018). 
Control the ongoing digital transformation 
Fundamental change is ongoing on the tech side, which provides both opportunities and 
threats to the financial system. The precise implications of technical developments are difficult 
to predict, but they are affecting all aspects of the market, from retail to wholesale, the entire 
value chain, products and processes. In essence, digitalisation will give financial service 
providers the opportunity to reduce costs and improve intermediation, thereby promoting 
more accessible and efficient financial markets (CEPS, UCC and LIST, 2016). 
In turn, technical developments are also creating some challenges. Financial services are heavily 
regulated, which limits the possibility for newcomers to enter the market. This raises the 
fundamental question whether the level playing field should be based on the activities or the 
level of risks involved. A more proportional approach (‘same risks-same rules’ level playing field) 
could spur innovation and new entrants. However, to avoid malpractice and potential 
destabilisation the new or changing providers, products and services should be closely 
monitored. 
Moreover, digital transformation brings specific challenges. Providers can, for example, be 
based in faraway jurisdictions, subject to different rules, but without the user realising and the 
supervisor controlling. The dependence on IT also raises fundamental issues for the 
cybersecurity of networks (Lannoo, 2018). 
Integrational considerations 
A large share of EU financial legislation has its origin in international bodies. The EU and several 
individual member states participating in the Financial Stability Board have committed to 
implementing the main international standards and codes as well as participating in peer 
reviews. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, many international initiatives focused on 
making systemic banks in general and globally systemically important banks in particular more 
POLICY PRIORITIES FOR 2019-2024 | 5 
 
resilient. Almost all of the standards and codes agreed in the aftermath of the financial crisis 
have been adopted and are currently or have been implemented in the EU.  
The finalised Basel III reforms agreed at the end of 2018 remain the main standards that still 
need to be transposed in the EU. Basel standards are mainly designed for internationally active 
banks, but are traditionally applied to all banks in the EU. Taking into consideration the different 
role that these banks play in the financial system and the distinction that has already between 
made between the supervision of significant and less significant banks in the Eurozone, it 
should be assessed whether a simplified regime for less significant banks would not be more 
appropriate, allowing these mostly retail banks to focus on lending to the real economy. 
The reforms in the aftermath of the financial crisis have contributed to the harmonisation of 
financial services legislation and coordination between supervisors across the EU. The 
supervision of credit rating agencies and trade repositories has even been concentrated within 
the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA). Within the Eurozone the supervision of 
significant banks and the resolution of significant and cross-border banks are also now 
concentrated within the Single Supervisory Mechanism and Single Resolution Mechanism 
respectively. However, cross-border activities remain limited. This is partially explained by the 
large differences between member states in consumer protection rules, anti-money laundering 
implementation, non-financial legislation (accounting, insolvency, taxation, etc.) and different 
market practices. 
Institutional considerations 
The change in policymaking procedure due to the new Commission structure with cross-cutting 
Vice-Presidents has had limited impact on financial services legislation. Jonathan Hill was 
Commissioner responsible for financial stability, financial services and CMU from November 
2014 until he stepped down in June 2016, after the UK decided to leave the EU. Hill’s 
responsibilities were taken over by Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis, which has not led to any 
notable adjustments to the financial services agenda. 
The institutional framework for financial services has, however, changed drastically in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis. At EU level, the European Supervisory Authorities were 
established. They are primarily responsible for promoting supervisory convergence and 
coordination as well as the preparation of technical standards and guidelines. In addition, the 
European Systemic Risk Board is responsible for the coordination of macro-prudential policies. 
Although the ESAs have independent chairpersons most of the decision-making power is with 
the board of supervisors, in which national supervisors have nearly all the votes. This significant 
role for national supervisors in decision-making increases red tape. Empowering the 
chairperson could contribute to making the authorities more effective as well as potentially 
giving them a more prominent role in the legislative process (Lamandini, 2018). 
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Figure 2. EU financial institutional framework 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations. 
Financial legislation is becoming increasingly complex and prescriptive. Policymakers and 
Members of the European Parliament are regularly indicating that they are no longer able to 
assess the appropriateness of the legislation. Moreover, the legislative cycle easily takes a 
couple of years, whereas the sector is changing at an ever faster pace. This requires a legislative 
procedure that allows for swifter changes and more coordination between policy areas. 
Legislation at a higher level (more principle-based and coherent across policy areas) 
complemented by technical standards that can be changed more easily should allow for faster 
policy responses and leverage the technical expertise that is available within the ESAs in 
preparing the standards.  
 
Key priorities for the next Commission 
• Complete the Banking Union 
• Create a true Capital Markets Union 
• Promoting sustainable finance 
• Control the ongoing digital transformation 
• Empower European supervisory authorities 
POLICY PRIORITIES FOR 2019-2024 | 7 
 
References 
Amariei, C. (2018), “Enabling Sustainable Savings and Investment Channels in Europe: 
Opportunities and Challenges”, 3rd Interim Report of the CEPS-ECMI Task Force on Asset 
Allocation in Europe, Brussels: ECMI. 
CEPS, UCC, LIST (2016), Study on the role of digitalisation and innovation in creating a true 
single market for retail financial services and insurance, European Commission 
Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union. 
De Groen, W.P. (2015), “The ECB’s QE: Time to break the doom loop between banks and their 
governments”, CEPS Policy Brief, CEPS, Brussels, 13 March. 
De Groen, W.P. (2017), “The provision of critical functions at global, national or regional level, 
In-Depth Analysis”, European Parliament, Brussels. 
De Groen, W.P. (2018), “Financing bank resolution: An alternative solution for arranging the 
liquidity required, In-Depth Analysis”, European Parliament, Brussels. 
Gros, D. (2015), “Completing the Banking Union: Deposit Insurance”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 335, 
CEPS, Brussels, December. 
Lamandini, M. (2018), “A supervisory architecture fit for CMU: Aiming at a moving target?”, 
ECMI Commentary, ECMI, Brussels, 9 August. 
Lannoo, K. (2018), “Cyber finance challenges demand a unified response, CEPS Policy Insights”, 
CEPS, Brussels, 25 October. 
Valiante, D. (2016), Europe's Untapped Capital Market: Rethinking integration after the great 
financial crisis, Brussels/London: CEPS/Rowman & Littlefield International. 
